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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALLACE R. SMITH, dba SMITH 
REALTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
C. TAYLOR BURTON, 
De jendant, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
Case No. 8302 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent and cross-appellant, C. Taylor Bur-
ton, is cross-appealing to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah from that part of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of the Honorable 
Joseph C. Jeppson dated the 17th of November, 
1954, which award to plaintiff the sum of $2,000.00, 
together with interest and costs and this Brief is 
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filed in support of such cross-appeal and as an an-
swer to appellant's Brief hertofore filed on his 
appeal. 
Throughout this Brief, appellant will be re-
ferred to as plaintiff and respondent and cross-
appellant will be referred to as defendant. All 
italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To the extent that defendant does not disagree 
with the Statement of Facts made in plaintiff's 
Brief, he will refrain from repeating such facts, and 
will confine his statement to facts as to which he 
may disagree with plaintiff or which he feels were 
omitted by plaintiff. 
On January 31, 1953, plaintiff, as broker ne-
gotiated an exchange of seven duplexes and certain 
personal property, subject to outstanding indebted-
ness, belonging to defendant, for a certain ranch 
belonging to Elder, subject to a mortgage, Exhibit 
No. 1. No values of any properties are mentioned 
therein, but a value of $19,000.00 per duplex, for 
trade purposes only was assigned by defendant, 
( R.243), which was a fictitious value and greatly in 
excess of the real or cash value (R.25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 
40,46,49,69,243). 
There existed no listing on the Elder property 
prior to the exchange (R.44, 45) and instead of the 
usual brokerage charge, plaintiff and defendant en-
tered into a special written agreement, written in 
ink on the reverse side of Exhibit 1, and later an 
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3 
amplification thereof, Exhibit 2, under which it was 
agreed that plaintiff should be paid for his services 
on the exchange with Elder, Exhibit 1, and for the 
sale of two remaining duplexes, by transfer of de-
fendant's equity in a third remaining duplex, pro-
vided that title to the duplex should be given only 
when plaintiff should have disposed of the two re-
maining duplexes. This Agreement, Exhibit 2, also 
provides that "In the event the broker shall sell first 
party's duplexes for a sum greater than $17,000.00 
net, then and in event the broker shall be entitled to 
retain such excess of money as further Commission 
compensation for his efforts". 
The parties discussed the terms of Exhibit 2 
before signing it and it was understood that plain-
tiff would be entitled to retain any excess over 
$17,000.00 only if cash sale, that cash sale was con-
templated and not a trade (R. 10, 33). 
Being anxious to obtain title to his duplex, 
(R. 181, 184), on May 1, 1953, plaintiff presented 
to defendant a proposition to exchange the two re-
maining duplexes, together with other personal and 
real properties, subject to mortgages owing on 
them, plus $3,000.00 cash, for a ranch adjacent to 
the Elder property, owned by Frank W. Toone. 
Plaintiff and defendant discussed the matter and the 
question of how such commission would become due 
from defendant to plaintiff for such exchange, in-
cluding the two duplexes, and how and under what 
conditions it would become payable. Plaintiff told 
defendant he could rent the pasture on the ranches 
for at least $4,000.00 for the season and since Bur-
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ton was short of cash, ( R.94) it was agreed that 
Smith would take the responsibility of renting the 
property and accept one-half of the rental, not ex-
ceeding $2,000.00, plus the horse, saddle, and bridle 
as payment in full for the commission on the Toone 
exchange Exhibit 3, including the two duplexes (R. 
34,35, 193,194, 191,229). 
Having satisfied himself that he would not have 
to raise any money for commission, that plaintiff, 
who wanted to make the deal so he could get title to 
his duplex, would accept one-half of what he could 
get as rental, not exceeding a maximum of $2,000.00, 
as his commission, then ·and only then, did defendant 
sign the commission agreement, Exhibit 7. It was 
signed ahead of the Toone exchange agreement, Ex-
hibit 3, ( R. 15, 38). 
On May 12, 1953, plaintiff presented to defen-
dant a new commission agreement, prepared by 
plaintiff for defendant's signature, Exhibit 8, which 
defendant refused to sign, explaining that it did not 
conform to their agreement, as it would impose on 
him an obligation to pay the $2,000.00 commission, 
whether plaintiff rented the pastures or not, which 
was contrary to their understanding and to their 
written agreement embodied in Exhibit 7. This pro-
posed agreement made no mention of any commis-
sion other than the $2,000.00 as being due Smith 
( R. 17, 18, 36, 189, 190). 
Plaintiff never made claim or even mentioned 
to defendant the $4,000.00 or any other amount as 
additional commission due him under Exhibit 2, 
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5 
until this action was commenced in December 1953 
(R. 37, 231, 232), more than seven months after the 
last transaction. 
The only sale or exchange ever negotiated by 
plaintiff of the two duplexes was the exchange to 
Toone under Exhibit 3 (R. 41, 44, 188, 189, 191, 
193). 
Plaintiff did not lease or rent the pastures to 
anyone during the 1953 season or at all, nor present 
a definite offer of lease, and no rental was realized 
therefrom. ( R. 215). 
The lower court correctly found that there be-
came due plaintiff, as commission, under the terms 
of Exhibit 2 (R. 253, Finding No. 5) a duplex sub-
ject to an outstanding mortgage, which was later 
deeded to plaintiff, but that no further commission 
was earned or became due plaintiff thereunder, 
since he failed to make a cash sale for more than 
$17,000.00. 
The court found that defendant and plaintiff 
entered into the agreement of May 1, 1953, Exhibit 
7, and that it was the understanding of the parties 
at the time of its execution that if plaintiff did not 
receive $2,000.00 commission from the rental of the 
pasture by November 1, 1953, that said sum 
would be due and payable from defendant to 
plaintiff, that no part thereof had been paid and 
that defendant was indebted to plaintiff for the sum 
of $2,000.00 (R. 253, in Finding No. 6). Based on 
said finding the court entered its Conclusions of Law 
(R. 254) and Decree (R. 255), granting judgment 
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to plaintiff, for $2,000.00 with interest at 6o/o from 
November 1, 1953 and costs. The court, in Finding 
#8, ( R. 254) found that the commission agreements, 
Exhibits 2 and 7, did not merge but remained sepa-
rate and distinct agreements throughout the deal-
ings between plaintiff and defendant. 
It is from the finding that it was the under-
standing of the parties at the time of the execution 
of Exhibit 7 that if plaintiff did not receive 
$2,000.00 commission from the rental of the pasture 
by November 1, 1953 that said sum would then be 
due and payable by defendant to plaintiff, and the 
Conclusions of Law based thereon and the Decree 
of the court awarding plaintiff said judgment, that 
defendant and cross-appellant appeals. 
Defendant also appeals from Finding #8 ( R. 
254) aforementioned. 
Defendant's chief objection is to the Finding 
in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact that "it was 
the understanding of the parties at the time of the 
execution of Exhibit 7, that if plaintiff did not re-
ceive his $2,000.00 commission from the rental of 
the pasture by November 1, 1953, that said sum 
would be due and payable from defendant to plain-
tiff", and to the Conclusions of Law and Decree 
based theron. 
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STATEMENTS OF POINTS RELIED UPON. 
FIRST AS TO THE CROSS APPEAL. 
POINT I. 
COMMISSION AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT 7, 
DEFINITELY LIMITS PLAINTIFF'S COMMIS-
SION FOR SERVICE IN THE TOONE EX-
CHANGE DEAL, EXHIBIT 3, TO ONE-HALF 
OF RENTAL FEE FOR PASTURE FOR 1953 
SEASON, UNTIL $2,000.00 IS SO REALIZED, 
PLUS A HORSE, SADDLE AND BRIDLE, 
PLAINTIFF TO RENT THE PASTURE. 
(a) It was a contingent fee. 
(b) The contingency never occurred, the pas-
tures were never rented, and no commis-
sion became due. 
(c) There is no competent evidence to support 
the finding and judgment of the lower 
court against defendant, and such judg-
ment should be reversed and set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
COMMISSION AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT 7, 
DEFINITELY LIMITS PLAINTIFF'S COMMIS-
SION FOR SERVICE IN THE TOONE EX-
CHANGE DEAL, EXHIBIT 3, TO ONE-HALF 
OF RENTAL FEE FOR PASTURE FOR 1953 
SEASON, UNTIL $2,000.00 IS SO REALIZED, 
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PLUS A HORSE, SADDLE AND BRIDLE, 
PLAINTIFF TO RENT THE PASTURE. 
(a) It was a contingent fee. 
Fortunately, this agrement was committed to 
writing, signed by both parties, and couched in such 
clear, unmistakable language as to leave no need 
or room for parole testimony to explain or construe 
its terms. It would be difficult for anyone, even a 
lawyer, in so few words to write a more clear or 
understandable agreement. Nothing is left in doubt. 
The law, in such cases, is elementary, holding 
as stated in the syllabus of the Utah case of Fox 
Film Corporation v. Ogden Theatre Company, 1932, 
17 P. 2d, 294; 90 A.L.R. 1299: 
"In the absence of fraud, or mistake, pa-
role evidence is not admisible to contradict, 
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a 
valid written instrument which purports to 
set forth the entire contract of the parties". 
To the same general effect see 20 Am. Juris. 958, 
963, 964, 968, 989, 990. At page 991 the following: 
"A written agreement dealing with the 
amount, time, and manner of payment is or-
dinarily conclusively to be presumed to em-
body all that element of the oral negotiation." 
Furthermore, plaintiff, if he is to recover at all, 
must, as stated by this court in Case v. Ralph, 188 
P. 640, base his claim on a written instrument cov-
ering all terms of his employment, showing his au-
thority to sell, the amount, terms, and conditions 
upon which his commission is to be paid. The court 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
there construed a section of our Statute of Frauds, 
which is now Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which provides: 
"Every agreement authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation" 
shall be void unless in writing. 
In this case, the entire problem of commission 
is covered by special agreements, Exhibits 2 and 7. 
It is not a case of paying the usual broker's commis-
sion on values of property sold. All testimony given 
at the trial on these subjects was clearly incompe-
tent and irrelevant and contrary to the parole evi-
dence rule. In its final determination of the case, the 
lower court seems to have recognized this and con-
fined itself to construing the two commission agree-
ments, Exhibits 2 and 7. Plaintiff testified that he 
was accustomed to making special contracts for com-
mission on transactions involving exchange of prop-
erties (R. 186, 197, 223). Plaintiff, Smith, was ac-
customed to handling large ranch deals involving 
exchanges and to making unusual arrangements for 
commission, sometimes getting more than the usual 
commission and sometimes less, sometimes payable 
in cash and sometimes in property, as in Exhibit 2. 
Here, plaintiff was anxious to negotiate a dis-
position of defendant's two remaining duplexes be-
cause only by so doing could he get title to the duplex 
which was commission for the Elder transaction and 
on the two duplexes. Remember, he had already 
collected full commission of $4,050.00 from Elder 
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and later also $2,628.00 from Toone, besides the 
duplex, with an equity value placed by Smith at 
$7400.00, from defendant (R. 210) or a total, in-
cluding the horse, saddle and bridle, conveyed to him 
by defendant, value at $150.00, of $13,214.45 (R. 
211). 
Should plaintiff recover what he asks in this 
action, he would, in effect, be collecting from defen-
dant three commissions on the two duplexes, besides 
collecting in full from the other parties to the ex-
changes: 
1st, $7 400.00 equity in duplex, which covered 
commission on Elder deal and on two duplexes, which 
figures considerably over a 5% commission; 
2d, the $4,000.00 plaintiff seeks under Exhibit 
2, which would be over a 10% commission on plain-
tiff's own trade value set on the two duplexes, but 
over 12% of the real value of approximately $32,-
000.00; and, 
3rd, The $2,150.00 cash, a horse, saddle and 
bridle under Exhibit 7, which would be at a rate of 
more than 51;2% of the $38,000.00 value of the Toone 
property, or a total commission on the two duplexes 
of over 221;2% of their value. 
He really hadn't done so badly, and it wasn't 
unusual or unlikely that he would enter into the con-
tingent fee agreement, Exhibit 7, providing that he 
would get one-half of the rental on the ranches for 
the 1953 season until he had realized $2,000.00 more, 
and that he would assume the responsibility of rent-
ing the ranches. Only by such an arrangement could 
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he get title to his duplex ( R. 181) and besides, he 
was an old hand at dealing in ranches. He told de-
fendant that he could rent the pasture for $4,000.00 
or $5,000.00 for the 1953 season (R. 228, 229). He 
was very confident. Besides he had everything to 
gain and nothing to lose. He and defendant had full 
discussion and only after plaintiff agreed to this 
contingent fee arrangement, did defendant agree to 
the exchange. ( R. 229). There was no discussion 
about the commission becoming due on November 
1, 1953, or at all, if $2,000.00 were not realized as 
rent. It would have been pointless for defendant to 
have written and signed this agreement, limiting his 
obligation and commission to one-half of the rents 
collected if in fact he had agreed to unconditional 
payment by November 1. One looks in vain for any 
date of November 1, 1953 in Exhibit 7 or for any 
statement indicating that the commission of $2,-
000.00 was to be paid in any event, whether realized 
from the pasture or not. On the contrary, it is a 
clear, logical, unambiguous, contingent fee agree-
ment, needing no clarification, entered into by two 
experienced businessmen with their eyes wide open, 
and for the distinct advantage of the plaintiff. It is 
not within the prerogative of the court to attempt to 
write a new contract for the parties. One might just 
as well cut the heart out of the human body and 
expect to have anything left as to cut out of this 
agreement the contingency element, limiting the 
amount of commission to one-half of the rent re-
ceived for pasture, and to substitute therefor an un-
conditional agreement to pay the commission by No-
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vember 1. The agreement of the parties would be 
completely emasculated and annihilated, bearing no 
resemblance to their understanding. This the court 
cannot do. 
Every day attorneys are entering into contin-
gent fee agreements on accident and other types of 
cases. So are real estate brokers. Every time they 
take a listing on real estate they enter into such a 
contingent commission agreement. If they sell, they 
are paid. If not, they get nothing. In this case, if 
plaintiff rented the pasture for $4,000.00 he would 
be paid $2,000.00. If not, he would get just one-half 
of all rent received. 
Later on May 12, 1953, after thinking it over 
for nearly two weeks, he concluded to get a better 
agreement, so presented Exhibit 8 to defendant, 
providing that he would get his $2,000.00 in any 
event. Defendant promptly declined to execute it, 
telling plaintiff it didn't correspond to their previous 
agreement (R. 17, 18, 36). 
(b) The contingency net'er occurred and no 
commission became due. 
Having established that the commission agree-
ment, Exhibit 7, was a contingent fee agreement, 
entitling plaintiff to a commission only out of rent 
received for pasture during 1953 season, it simply 
remains to determine what amount was collected as 
rent, and what plaintiff's one-half share is. 
There is no conflict in the evidence to the effect 
that no rent was received ( R. 215). Since the con-
tingency never occurred, which would entitle plain-
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tiff to a commission under Exhibit 7, he was entitled 
to none, except the horse, saddle and bridle which 
were conveyed. 
(c) There is no competent evidence to support 
the finding and judgment of the lower 
court against defendant, and such judg-
ment should be reversed and set aside. 
We submit that there is no con1petent evidence 
to support the Finding and Decree entered against 
defendant and that the lower court erred in its find-
ing that defendant owed plaintiff $2,000.00 and in 
entering judgment for that amount, and we urge 
that the judgment be reversed and set side. 
SECOND: NOW, AS TO PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
$4,000.00 OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT OF ADDI-
TIONAL COMMISSION FROM DEFENDANT, 
BEYOND THE DUPLEX, UNDER THE COM-
MISSION AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 17, 
1953, EXHIBIT 2. 
(a) A transfer of the duplex to plaintiff was 
the entire commission for sale or exchange 
of the remaining two duplexes, unless a 
cash sale were made, in which event plain-
tiff could retain such excess of money over 
$17,000.00 as further commission. No cash 
sale was made and no money received, 
which could be retained. Hence, no further 
commission became due plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II, AND PARAGRAPH (a) THEREOF. 
We think the trial court erred in finding, Find-
ing #8, (R. 254), that the two agreements, numbers 
2 and 7, did not merge but remained separate and 
distinct agreements throughout the dealings be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. In our opinion, Ex-
hibit 2 merged in Exhibit 7 or was superceded and 
replaced by it as to the part involving any additional 
commission which might become due for sale of the 
two duplexes, but that will be argued later in this 
Brief. The court did find that Exhibit 2 provided 
for additional commission for sale of the two du-
plexes only if sold for more than $17,000.00 cash 
each; that no such sale was made ·and therefore no 
additional commission became due. We shall limit 
this part of our argument to support of the court's 
finding in this respect and in opposition to plain-
tiff's appeal therefrom. 
The trial court based its decision, denying 
plaintiff additional compensation on an interpreta-
tion of the memo on the back of Exhibit 1 and the 
agreement of February 17, 1953, Exhibit 2. We 
think it was correct in this interpretation. As plain-
tiff says in his Brief, these must be considered to-
gether. The first memo nowhere refers to "ex-
change", but only to "sale". No reference is made 
to any additional commission to plaintiff beyond the 
duplex. The addition of the words "will accept reas-
onable terms", does not imply an exchange, but 
merely that the cash might be accepted on reason-
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able terms. Plaintiff certainly can get no comfort or 
support from this original agreement. Plaintiff cites, 
at page 8 of his Brief, as authority to show that this 
is a sale rather than an exchange, the Utah case of 
Blackburn vs. Bozo, but this case is clearly distin-
guishable on its facts, from the one at bar. There, 
after providing for sale for cash, it said: 
"Or any other terms that may be agreeable to 
me". 
The court held the broker was entitled to commis-
sion. That was clearly different from our case. Ex-
hibit 1 referred only to "sale", which necessarily 
must be presumed to be for cash, and merely adds: 
"Will accept reasonable terms", which clearly means 
cash terms, and our parties passed on to Exhibit 2, 
seventeen days later, to fortify defendant's position 
by again referring to "sale" and saying that "excess 
of money" could be retained. That clearly reaffirmed 
that a sale for money was mandatory as a condition 
for additional commission. The cases are entirely 
different. 
After plaintiff had had seventeen days to think 
it over, he prepared and had signed by defendant 
Exhibit 2. Therefore, in interpreting the contract 
"it must be construed most strongly against him" 
as stated in the Utah case of Mifflin v. Shiki, 293 
P.l. 
Now what does this greatly disputed document, 
Exhibit 2, really provide? It seems to us that it 
really divides itself off into two rather well defined 
parts. First, it provides for the transfer to plaintiff 
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by defendant of a duplex as commission for the 
Elder transaction and future disposition, yet to be 
made, of defendant's two remaining duplexes. And, 
second, it provides that if plaintiff sells the two du-
plexes for a sum greater than $17,000.00 net each, 
"then and in event the Broker shall be entitled to 
retain such excess of money as a further commis-
sion". 
It should be observed that whenever the term 
"exchange" is used alone or the words "sale or ex-
change" are used together in said agreement, they 
refer to the requirement that defendant transfer to 
plaintiff, title to the duplex and fix the time when 
and conditions under which he shall do so. In other 
words, on a sale or exchange of the duplexes for 
$17,000.00 net, the deed must issue, but,-and this 
is important-in the part of the agreement refer-
ring to possible additional commission, we find no 
use of the word "exchange", but only the words 
"sale" and the provision that such commission shall 
be realized by permitting plaintiff to "retain such 
excess of money". Plaintiff must look to this one sen-
tence alone for his rights. These words, taken to-
gether, can mean only a "sale" and not an "ex-
change". 
One can retain only something which has there-
tofore come into his possession. He could retain only 
"such excess m01ney". No money had come into plain-
tiff's possession. How then could he retain it? For-
tunately we are not left in the wilderness by the 
courts on this distinction between "sale" and "ex-
change." 
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Perhaps our best Utah case on the subject of 
broker's commission defining "sale", which is based 
upon facts quite similar to ours, is Watson v. Odell, 
198 P. 772. It says: 
"A sale is ordinarily understood to mean 
a transfer of property for money". 
Further, "No commission was payable 
except in the event of a consummation of a 
sale, and no commission was payable except 
as the purchase price was paid. These con-
tracts required more from the plaintiff than 
merely to find a purchaser able, willing, and 
ready to buy. The actual payment of the pur-
chase price was required, and only after the 
purchase price was paid were the commission 
installments due and payable * * * . Under 
our statute the plaintiff could recover his 
commission only by virtue of his contract. 
He could not recover on quantum meruit". 
In our case, plaintiff could recover, if at all, only 
under a special contract and only by retaining part 
of money collected. He collected none. There was no 
money to retain. 
In the case of Mifflin v. Shiki, supra, a case 
very similar to this one it is said, in the syllabus and 
body, 
Again, 
"Contract must be construed more 
strongly against one preparing it". 
"Broker effecting exchange of proper-
ties, instead of sale, cannot recover commis-
sion unless written contract specifically pro-
vides therefor". 
"Neither did the court err in consider-
ing the contract as being one for sale rather 
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than for an exchange, and that the commis-
sion of 109'o (which is much higher than the 
usual commission charged by real estate 
brokers for such service) was payable to the 
broker only upon procuring a purchaser for 
a money consideration''. 
Plaintiff's Brief, at page 11, cites the California 
case of Robbins vs. Pacific Eastern Corporation as 
authority for claiming that an exchange is in fact 
two sales. That case is no authority in the case at 
bar, because it is based entirely on a California 
statute. Utah has no similar statute. 
The Wyoming case of Murphy v. W & W Live-
stock Company, 189 P. 857 holds: 
"Where by the contract of employment, 
the commission is made upon certain condi-
tions and contingencies, as upon the actual 
consummation of the sale, or the full payment 
of the purchase money * * * these stipula-
tions will govern, and a fulfillment of per-
formance of the prescribed conditions is gen-
erally essential to the right to compensation". 
In Lindley v. Fay, 119 Cal. 239, 51 P. 333, we 
find: 
"Under the contract of March 7, the 
commission was to be paid out of proceeds of 
sale, when received, and unless a payment be 
made, no commission would be due". 
Apple v. Henry, 213 P. 444, a Montana case, 
quotes with approval from Williamson v. Berry, 12 
L. Ed. 1170, wherein the Supreme Court of the 
United States says: 
"Sale is a word of precise legal import, 
both at law ·and in equity. It means at all 
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times a contract ·between the parties to give 
and to pass rights of property for money, 
which the buyer pays or promises to pay to 
the seller for the things bought or sold." 
Finally the Colorado court in Thompson v. 
Alley, 238 P. 62 held: · 
"Broker, suing on contract to pay com-
mission for sale of property, cannot recover 
thereon, where parties exchanged properties 
encumbered on both sides, but is limited to 
compensation on quantum meruit for services 
performed, such transaction not being a 
sale". 
Nothing was received by the plaintiff for the 
two duplexes and the only thing received by defen-
dant for thenl, other ~ personal and real property 
and $3,000.00 cash1was a ranch, one indivisible piece 
of property. No part of that could be retained by 
plaintiff and the only way he could get his claimed 
$4,000.00 additional commission, would be for de-
fendant to advance that much cash, a burden he 
might not be able to discharge. Plaintiff testified 
that defendant didn't have any money, because of 
the two big subdivisions he was developing, (R. 94) 
and wanted him to take his commission in other than 
money. Burton testified that the agreement in Ex-
hibit 2 to pay extra commission was based on a 
cash sale and that a trade or exchange was not con-
templated. (R. 10, 33). 
Defendant actually received less, even in prop-
erty, than $17,000.00 real value or cash equivalent 
for his two duplexes in the trade with Toone, Ex-
hibit 3. Toone had placed an inflated, fictitious value, 
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for trade purposes, of $52,578.00 on his ranch, (R. 
25, 29). The real value was only $38,400.00. (R. 28). 
The parties were merely trading equities on higher 
than cash value. (R. 29, 243). He didn't receive as 
much as $17,000.00 real value for the duplexes (R. 
31, 40). Burton figured the real value of each du-
plex $15,250.00 (R. 49). He increased his fictitious 
trade value on each Toone duplex at least $3,000.00, 
to meet Toone's inflated value (R. 29), and the trad-
ing price of each of the Elder duplexes was boosted 
about $3500.00 ( R. 36). Toone finally sold his two 
duplexes for $14,750.00 and $15,000.00 gross, re-
spectively, from which he had to pay 5% commis-
sion (R. 30, 69). Smith offered the duplex which 
he received for $16,000.00 (R. 31). So, it is con-
clusively shown that Burton got less than $17,000.00 
real value, even in property, for his duplexes and 
that the $19,000.00 fictitious trade value meant ab-
solutely nothing. This destroys all plausibility that 
he would have made such a deal, if in doing so he 
would subject himself to the necessity of going out 
and raising $4,000.00 spot cash to pay additional 
commission. 
The courts hold that the chief object in con-
struing contracts is to ascertain the intention of the 
contracting parties and subsequent actions and con-
duct of the parties may be considered, in arriving at 
the intention. See Gladys Belle Oil Company v. Clark, 
et al, 296 P. 461, an Oklahoma case, decided in 1931. 
Brockway v. Blair, 53 Mont. 531; 165 P. 455. 
Burroughs v. Petroleum Development Co. 184 
P. 5; 181 Cal. 253. 
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Luitweiler Pumping Engine Co. v. Ukiah Water 
& Improvement Co. 116 P. 707, 16 Cal. App. 198. 
Utah Con. Co. v. Mcllwee, 266 P. 1094, 45 Ida-
ho 707. 
Crowell Elevator Co. v. Kerr Gifford & Co. 236 
P. 1047; 114 Ore. 675; Johnson v. Geddes, 161 P. 
910; 49 Utah 137. 
In this case, when the Toone exchange was be-
ing written up and Exhibit 7 executed and later 
when plaintiff prepared Exhibit 8 he made no men-
tion whatever about being entitled to the $4,000.00 
or any additional commission. It is inconceivable 
that he would have ignored this if in fact he felt he 
was entitled thereto, especially since Exhibit 7 clear-
ly states that $2,000.00 is to be the entire commis-
sion for the Toone exchange, which included the two 
duplexes in question. The testimony is conclusive 
that this matter was discussed before Burton would 
agree to the Toone exchange, and it was definitely 
agreed that defendant was not liable for any more 
commission for sale of the two duplexes beyond the 
$2,000.00 contingent fee referred to in Exhibit 7, 
and then, and only then, did defendant consent to 
sign Exhibit 7, and Exhibit 3. (R. 35, 191, 193, 194, 
229). 
Between February 17, 1953, when Exhibit 2 
was executed, and December 1953, when the com-
plaint was filed, not one word was said by plaintiff 
to defendant about this supposed $4,000.00 addi-
tional commission or about any more commission 
due except the $2,000.00 claimed under Exhibit 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
( R. 37, 231-2). Yet he was hounding defendant con-
stantly about the $2,000.00. If he had really claimed 
or felt he was entitled to an additional $4,000.00, he 
most certainly would have mentioned it and demand-
ed payment of that also. Clearly, this is an after-
thought with him. 
This should dispose of plaintiff's claim as it was 
disposed of by the lower court, and the court's de-
cision on this particular matter should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
BOTH COMMISSION AGREEMENTS, EX-
HIBIT 2 AND EXHIBIT 7, REFER TO AND 
COVER THE COMMISSION TO BE PAID 
PLAINTIFF FOR THE ONLY SALE MADE OF 
THE TWO DUPLEXES. THEIR TERMS ARE 
INCONSISTENT. THEREFORE THE LATTER 
ONE, EXHIBIT 7, SUPERCEDES AND RE-
SCINDS THE EARLIER ONE, EXHIBIT 2, AND 
CONSTITUTES THE ONLY AGREEMENT UP-
ON THE SUBJECT ENFORCEABLE BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
(a) Exhibit 7 was a contingent fee agreement. 
The contingency never occurred, and no 
commission became due pl:aintiff there-
under. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III AND PARAGRAPH (a) THEREOF. 
There is no dispute whatever in the testimony 
to the effect that there was only one sale of the two 
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duplexes by plaintiff, ie: the Toone exchange, Ex-
hibit 3, and that no rental was received from the 
pasture during the 1953 season. 
Furthermore, no one can question that Exhibits 
2 and 7 both refer to the same subject, ie: the com-
mission to be paid plaintiff for the sale of the two 
duplexes, and that they are inconsistent on that sub-
ject. The first one, Exhibit 2, provides that plain-
tiff shall be entitled, in the event of a "sale" to "re-
tain the excess of money" over $17,000.00 net, while 
the second one, Exhibit 7, which refers to the only 
disposition ever made of the two duplexes, ie: the 
Toone exchange, Exhibit 3, says that as payment in 
full for the exchange of, among other property, the 
two duplexes, plaintiff shall receive a contingent fee 
of $2,000. 00. 
To the extent of this inconsistency, the law is 
well settled that the later one rescinds and super-
cedes the earlier one and to that extent the earlier 
one is merged in the later one. 
Our own Supreme Court has settled this so far 
as Utah is concerned in the case of Orpheus Vaude-
ville Co. v. Clayton Inv. Co. 128 P. 575, in the fol-
lowing language: 
"In support of the first ground, counsel 
for respondent vigorously insist that the 
transaction between the parties to this case 
is governed by the following rule, to-wit: 
That where the parties to an existing agree-
ment subsequently enter into a new one com-
pletely covering the same subject-matter con-
tained in the first and the later agreement 
contains terms inconsistent with the first one 
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so that the two cannot stand together, the le-
gal effect of the later agreement is to release 
and supercede the former, and the later one 
constitutes the only agreement upon the sub-
ject enforceable between the parties. 
The rule that there cannot be two incon-
sistent, enforceable agreements between th£ 
parties covering the same subject-matter is 
elementary.'' 
See to the same effect: The Idaho case of Bruce 
v. Oberbillig, 268 P. 35; Housekeeper Pub. Co. v. 
Swift (C.C.A.) 97 F. 290; Bourn v. Dowdell, 50 P. 
695; Youngberg v. Warehouse Company 171 P. 97. 
It is well put in the syllabus to Gladys Bell Oil 
Company v. Clark, supra, 
"A written contract may be discharged, 
rescinded, altered, or changed at anytime be-
fore performance thereof is due, by the exe-
cution of a new agreement in writing and, 
when such is done, the terms and provisions 
of the new agreement govern as to the rights 
of the parties thereto". 
The Washington Supreme Court has thus 
spoken, in Smith v. Cadillac Motor Car Company, 
277 P. 453: 
"It is undoubtedly the law that the legal 
effect of a subsequent contract between the 
same parties and covering the same subject 
matter as an earlier agreement between them 
containing terms inconsistent with the prior 
contract so that the two cannot stand to-
gether is to rescind the earlier contract". 
Sherman v. Sweeney, 29 Washington 321, 69 
P. 1117. 
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Having heretofore, in this Brief, analyzed the 
evidence having to do with the execution of Exhibits 
2 and 7, and surrounding circumstances, including 
the conversation at the time of the execution of Ex-
hibit 2, to the effect that the additional commission 
on the two duplexes was based on a cash sale; the 
conversation which preceded the signing of Exhibit 
7 and then Exhibit 3, to the effect that defendant 
would not agree to the Toone exchange until it was 
thoroughly understood and agreed that the $2,000.00 
contingent fee provided in Exhibit 7 was the total 
commission to be paid for sale of the two duplexes 
and other property in said transaction ; and the fact 
that plaintiff never once referred to or demanded 
the $4,000.00 or any other commission except the 
$2,000.00 until this action was filed, we shall refrain 
from repeating same and simply refer the court 
thereto in support of this point in our Brief. 
We maintain that the trial court was correct 
in its interpretation of Exhibit 2, so far as it applies 
to the necessity of a cash sale or sale for money, to 
entitle plaintiff to the commission he seeks and since 
none was made, plainiff became entitled to none. 
However, we go further, and say that plaintiff 
has a further and insurmountable hurdle which he 
cannot negotiate, ie: even if he could, by any stretch 
of the imgination, be held, except for Exhibit 7, to 
have performed under Exhibit 2, so as to be entitled 
to an additional commission, he is estopped to claim 
it, because, before he disposed of the two duplexes, 
he entered into the agreement, Exhibit 7, covering 
the same subject; that the two agreements are in-
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consistent, and that the later one prevails and re-
scinds and supercedes the earlier one and he can look 
alone to Exhibit 7. 
As is pointed out in great detail in Point I of 
this Brief, plaintiff never performd the contingency 
which would entitle him to a commission under Ex-
hibit 7. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits: 
(a) That the lower court erred in its findings 
and decree awarding plaintiff a $2,000.00 judgment 
under Exhibit 7, and that the decision on this point 
should be reversed. 
(b) That the trial court correctly construed 
Exhibit 2, to require a sale for.cash or money to en-
title plaintiff to further commission, and correctly 
found that no such sale was made and that therefore 
no commission became due plaintiff under Exhibit 2. 
The judgment on this point should be affirmed. 
(c) That the lower court erred in its finding 
#8, that Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 7 did not merge but 
remained separate and distinct agreements through-
out the dealings between plaintiff and defendant. 
That on the contrary, Exhibit 2 was rescinded and 
replaced by Exhibit 7 and to the extent of this in-
consistency, merged with Exhibit 7, and that plain-
tiff never performed under Exhibit 7 so as to en-
title him to any further commission, either the 
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$4,000.00 claimed under Exhibit 2 or the $2,000.00 
claimed under Exhibit 7. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON ROMNEY and ROMNEY & NELSON 
Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
Received three copies of the foregoing Brief 
this ________ day of April, 1955. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK and DWIGHT L. KING, 
Counsel for Appellant. 
By------------------------------------------------------
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